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The member states of the European Union obey the obligations of the European treaties in a 
manner resembling states or provinces under a federal constitution. Existing explanations for this 
extraordinary obedience to international law should be rejected because they assume, incorrectly, 
that national legislatures cannot unilaterally legislate contrary to European Community law, or 
contain unexplained assumptions that relevant public goods will be reliably provided. This paper 
proposes a new explanation: the EU member states obey the European ‘constitution’ because 
domestic political institutions in the EU member states are ‘encompassing’: centralised and 
orientated towards large constituencies that benefit from the provision of public goods. The paper 
therefore offers a new answer to a long standing puzzle about the European Union as well as 
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 1 Introduction
1
There is a remarkable academic consensus about one aspect – perhaps the most distinctive 
aspect – of the world’s most powerful international organisation, the European Union. Political 
scientists and legal scholars both agree that EU member states obey costly European obligations 
in much the same way that jurisdictions within a federal state comply with federal law. The 
effectiveness of the European Union’s system of preventing member states taking unilateral 
action contrary to European obligations is why the European treaties are frequently referred to as 
Europe’s ‘constitution’.
2 Explaining this extraordinary obedience should be of interest to the 
widest community of IR scholars, since – recast in general terms – an answer would demonstrate 
circumstances under which states would submit with a very high degree of reliability to a stream 
of costs on a variety of organised domestic interests.  
Existing explanations for the obedience of the EU member states to the European 
‘constitution’ emphasise the doctrines and politics of European law. However, existing 
scholarship fails to explain why organised interests do not induce national political institutions to 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank the following for their comments and advice on this project: Andrew 
Moravcsik, Peter Hall, Michael J Hiscox, Hillel Soifer, Mark Copelovitch, Lisa Martin, Beth 
Simmons, Laura Beers, Holger Spamann, Franz C. Mayer, Anna Brewer Stilz, Fernanda Nicola, 
Francesca Strumia, Francesca Bignami, Peter Lindseth, Gerard Hogan, Diarmuid Rossa Phelan, 
Scott Siegel, and Thomas Däubler. I gratefully acknowledge the support of a Small Research 
Project Grant from the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences.  
2 The ‘constitutional’ nature of the EU’s legal regime should not be confused with the 
‘constitutional treaty’ agreed in 2004 and rejected in referenda in 2005. The EU’s legal regime 
has been characterised as a ‘constitution’ long before that treaty (Eg. Stein 1965; Weiler 1999). 
 2 selectively withdraw their obedience to European law, in exactly the same way that states 
frequently offer only selective compliance with the obligations of other international institutions.  
This paper proposes a new explanation. Drawing on Olson’s discussion of 
‘encompassing’ groups in the theory of collective action, which has been so influential in the 
literature on corporatism, it argues that states with encompassing domestic institutions – where 
authoritative decision-making is centralised and orientated towards large constituencies which 
benefit from public goods – can reliably submit to a stream of costly international obligations, 
just as centralised and inclusive trade union federations can reliably accept obligations which 
impose considerable costs on workers in particular sectors and firms (Olson 1982).  
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section outlines the scholarly consensus on the 
‘constitutional’ effectiveness of European law. The second section considers a range of 
explanations for the effectiveness of the European ‘constitution’. These explanations should be 
rejected because they assume, incorrectly, that national legislatures cannot unilaterally legislate 
contrary to European Community law (‘EC law’), or contain unexplained assumptions that 
relevant public goods will be provided. The third section develops a new explanation for the 
‘constitutional’ obedience of the EU member states to European obligations, based on domestic 
political institutions and the concept of the encompassing group. A final section concludes with 
implications for wider research agendas.  
The European ‘Constitution’ 
The European Union is the international organisation by which European states organise a 
single market and manage externalities of national policy-making in trade and many other issue-
areas. Originating in the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the ‘European Union’, as 
it has been called since 1994, now includes 27 European states. The European treaties create 
 3 international institutions – the European Commission (an international secretariat), the Council of 
Ministers (the forum where member states negotiate rule-making at the European level), the 
European Parliament (an assembly of elected representatives, since 1979 directly elected by the 
peoples of the member states), and the European Court of Justice (an international tribunal, 
hereafter ‘ECJ’). By a variety of procedures, these treaty institutions produce rules – ‘European 
Community law’ – for the member states and monitor compliance with them. The content of EU 
rule-making is broadly liberalising of trade and economic exchange between the member states, 
although some policies constitute the coordination of rent-seeking at the European level.  
The European Union can therefore be understood as an international regime where 
expectations for state behaviour in anarchy are stabilised through the operations of principles, 
norms, and rules (Krasner 1983).
 3 Indeed, the European Union offers extensive stabilisation of 
expectations about state behaviour. While the weak binding power of international treaties is a 
recurring theme in many classic articles in international relations, supported by many historical 
examples, the EU offers a very different picture. As Alter writes, “The European Community’s 
legal system is everywhere cited as the best example of an authoritative international legal system 
that actually works … It works much like a domestic rule of law, where violations of the law are 
brought to court [and] legal decisions are respected” (Alter 2001: ix, 1). Prominent skeptics of the 
binding power of international law, by contrast, leave the EU out of their analysis as too closely 
resembling a federal system (Goldsmith and Posner 2005: 5). Detailed case studies demonstrate 
that actual compliance with costly EU rules compares favorably with compliance with similar 
rules within the WTO and even within federal states such as Germany and the United States 
                                                 
3 Of course the EU can at times be usefully compared not just to international regimes, but to a 
wider range of phenomena, including a variety of federal arrangements.  
 4 (Zürn and Joerges 2005). Nonetheless, the formal institutions in the EU are merely treaties and 
international organizations.  
To be sure, the European states that are members of the European Union do exhibit 
variation in their compliance with EU obligations: some states are more often prosecuted by the 
European Commission, some states settle cases early while others only comply after ECJ 
decisions, and so on (eg. Börzel 2001; Tallberg 2002). It is also true that the impact of legal 
obligations is at times significantly limited by, for example, inequality of resources and 
restrictive rules of standing for litigation (Conant 2002; Cichowski 2007). But these divergences 
and limitations are just the sort of variation one would expect among various provinces or states 
subject to a single constitution, even in the presence of a federal Weberian monopoly of 
legitimate violence. Put another way, variation in failure to comply with EU obligations is 
truncated within a much narrower scope of behavior than failure to comply with other cost-
imposing international treaties, such that it closely approximates modest variations in compliance 
within federal state systems such as the US. This brings us to the question of how this 
extraordinary level of obedience can be explained. 
Explanations for Member State obedience to the European ‘Constitution’.  
This paper adopts the approach of limiting acceptable arguments to those build on 
collective action theory based explanations of states and organized groups in international 
relations: both states and organized domestic constituents are understood to be rationalist and 
egoist – that is, expected to be goal-seeking, including seeking consumption at least cost, and 
indifferent to the interests of other actors. While state rationality and egoism are accepted by a 
wide range of theoretical approaches to IR, this requirement for microfoundations in domestic 
politics is most consistent with ‘state-society’, ‘preference-based’, or ‘liberal’ IR theory 
 5 (Moravcsik 1997). For international economic regimes, it is particularly important to understand 
how regimes manage the political influence of small well-organized groups with interests in 
defection, to avoid underestimating the political problems of opportunism associated with 
international commitments (Olson 1965). Even if an international commitment provides benefits 
for states as a whole, it may not be compatible with the political influence of organized groups.  
Possible explanations for the constitutional obedience to EU obligations would include: 
the limited costs associated with EU obligations; the benefits that states derive from the European 
Union; specific reciprocity; the supremacy and direct effect of EC law; and incentives for 
compliance resulting from state reputation. These are now considered in turn.  
Limited Costs of EU Obligations?  
A plausible explanation for the ‘constitutional’ obedience that EU member states offer to 
their European obligations would suggest that the obedience is relatively trivial since the 
obligations themselves do not impose substantial costs on states or organized interests (Stein 
1982; Downs, Rocke et al. 1996). In the EU case, however, obligations include extensive controls 
of national measures that distort trade, as well as ambitious environmental regulations, which 
change relative prices in the member states and therefore create demand for defection from 
adversely affected organized interests in those states. The demand for defection is present even 
where it cannot be observed or where it is politically unsuccessful (Frieden 1999). The current 
literature on EU member states obedience to EU obligations is in overwhelming agreement on 
this point: many EU obligations are costly and create strong incentives for unilateral defection 
(eg. Moravcsik 1998: 9; Tallberg 2002: 612; Stone Sweet 2004: 7; Wolf 2005: 66; Alter 2001: 
43). Thus the claim that the EU member states ‘constitutional’ obedience to EU obligations 
reflects their limited costs cannot be sustained.  
 6 The Benefits provided by the European Union? 
The European Union produces significant benefits for its member states, including the 
management of a reliable European-wide market for goods and services, and the collective 
management – which may increase their bargaining power – of the member states’ commercial 
relationships with non-European states and regions (Moravcsik 1998). 
However, the benefits derived from international regimes do not explain the effectiveness 
of international obligations. These benefits are public goods from the point of view of the 
member states and – even more so – their varied constituents. Member states and organized 
interests have incentives to free-ride by refusing to contribute to these public goods. The essential 
cause of compliance problems is the demand for selective, issue-specific defection even from 
obligations to which the state has committed itself. States often comply selectively with 
international treaty obligations, invading other countries contrary to the UN use of force regime, 
or unilaterally imposing protectionist rules contrary to WTO obligations, even while remaining 
member states of such multilateral arrangements (Weiler 1985). From the point of view of a 
rational and egoist organized interest, selective defection from international obligations can yield 
substantial gains, even if this imposes costs on other interests or damages the international regime 
as a whole. Although it is sometimes tempting for EU specialists to believe that there is no reason 
to expect EU member states to unilaterally defect from obligations previously voluntarily agreed 
to, this scenario is in fact common in relation to the obligations of other international 
organizations that attempt to provide collective benefits by imposing costs on states and 
organized interests – WTO, IMF, UN, League of Nations, OPEC, etc - and the pervasively 
reliable obedience within the EU requires an appropriate explanation.  
 7 Inferring that the benefits of international regimes themselves explain compliance with 
their obligations makes the same mistake as implying that the benefits of low inflation explain 
the effectiveness of wage moderation agreements or the benefits of peace explain contributions to 
collective security systems. A suitable causal mechanism is required to explain the provision of 
these public goods. Thus the benefits provided by the European Union cannot explain the 
‘constitutional’ obedience that the EU member states offer to their European obligations.  
Specific Reciprocity? 
The main rationalist explanation for compliance with costly international regime 
obligations is tit-for-tat specific reciprocity, where states punish each other for free-riding on 
international open markets by withdrawing equivalent trading opportunities to sanction unilateral 
protectionism (Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984). 
Specific reciprocity is an explanation for costly international cooperation under anarchy 
which is compatible with the assumptions of rationality and egoism by both states and interest 
groups. Tit-for-tat specific reciprocity addresses trade multilateralism’s incentives to free-ride 
while being robust to changing and diverse interest group influences (Martin 1992: 771-772). Tit-
for-tat trade-sanctions compliance systems are pervasive in international economic regimes, 
including the WTO and NAFTA (WTO: Lawrence 2003; NAFTA and WTO: Pauwelyn 2006). 
Nevertheless, tit-for-tat specific reciprocity does not explain the constitutional obedience 
of the EU member states to EU obligations. First, members of tit-for-tat based international 
organizations do not offer ‘constitutional’ obedience to regime obligations. Indeed, specific 
reciprocity’s accommodation of participants’ unilateral, selective, and even permanent non-
compliance is considered one of its inherent strengths (eg. Palmeter 2003). 
 8 Furthermore, the European Union’s distinctive international legal system operates to 
forbid, rather than enable, tit-for-tat enforcement of agreements amongst governments. As the 
ECJ stated in the foundational case Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato v. Essevi: 
“[a]bove all, it must be pointed out that in no circumstances may the Member States rely on 
similar infringements by other Member States in order to escape their own obligations under the 
provisions of the Treaty” (Cases 142&143/80). 
The ECJ’s decision in Essevi is directly contrary to the working of a WTO-style tit-for-tat 
specific reciprocity mechanism, which is based precisely on the arrangement that its member 
states escape their obligations in response to infringements by other parties. The EU’s legal 
regime forbids specific reciprocity in theory, nor does the EU make use of it in practice. Thus the 
EU cannot be understood as a specific reciprocity regime.  
The Constitutional Doctrines of European Community Law? 
This section will set out the major prevailing explanation for the obedience of the EU 
member states to European obligations: the doctrines – and politics – of EC law. Of course, many 
arrangements between states to organise markets and manage externalities take the form of 
international treaties which carry the force of international law. However, in the anarchy of 
international relations, states cannot be prevented from adopting domestic policies contrary to 
international obligations and purely legal arguments for state behaviour are not credible (Carr 
1940). After all, state courts only apply international legal obligations if national laws provide for 
their application, so it is possible – even routine – for gaps to open up between international legal 
obligations and national policy.  
The international legal system of the European Union however has very important 
differences from ‘ordinary’ public international law. Although the European Union legal system 
is complex, the essential doctrinal elements which differentiate EC law from other legal systems 
 9 and which are essential to its ‘constitutional’ status are supremacy and direct effect
4. In order to 
provide an answer to the puzzle this paper is addressing, consistent with the existing political 
science literature, some background on the concepts and structure of the EU legal regime is 
necessary here.  
First, and most important, the EC law doctrine of supremacy, first elaborated by the ECJ 
in Costa v. ENEL (Case 4/64), claims the supremacy of all Community legal obligations over all 
national laws, including both subsequently enacted legislation and national constitutions. (Note 
that the crucial doctrinal element of supremacy is not contained in the treaties establishing the 
European Community, but was independently elaborated by the ECJ.) The Community law 
doctrine of direct effect, first elaborated in Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62), claims that many 
European obligations should be applied as law in the courts of the member states, at the suit of 
private parties, without any national legal act to transform or incorporate them into national law, 
that is, without any national legal act to authorise or mediate their effect (in the words of the Van 
Gend en Loos judgment: ‘independently of the legislation of the member states’). 
The Community legal system therefore differs from other forms of international legal 
systems. Other international courts, such as WTO panels, may declare the illegality in 
international law of the result of national measures where these are contrary to treaty obligations. 
These courts, however, may not declare the non-application of the internal measures in question. 
It remains for the state concerned to change their internal measures, or – as they choose – not. 
The Community legal system, by contrast, claims not only to determine the legality of national 
                                                 
4 Not all EU obligations are directly effective and thus ‘constitutional’ in the sense considered 
here. In particular, the budget obligations arising from the EU’s ‘Growth and Stability Pact’ are 
not enforced by directly effective EC law and are outside the scope of this paper. 
 10 measures in relation to obligations deriving from the Community treaties but also that EC law 
requires national courts to apply Community obligations where national law is contrary to EC 
law. In other words, EC law requires that European obligations are followed whether national law 
provides for it or not. 
As the doctrine of direct effect suggests, the ECJ is not the only court that applies EC law. 
Where Community law obligations enjoy direct effect, national judges apply EC law in national 
courts in litigation open to private parties. So, in addition to the possibility of litigation in the ECJ 
initiated by other member states and by the European Commission, national courts provide an 
extensive and decentralized monitoring and sanctioning system for national failures to comply 
with costly EU obligations, guided by a ‘preliminary reference’ system (in Art 177 of the original 
EEC treaty) through which national judges refer questions of European law to the ECJ and then 
pronounce their own judgment after the ECJ has decided on the interpretation of Community law. 
So the Irish judge in Dublin and the German judge in Bremen apply European law in their courts.  
This then is the ‘constitutional’ legal regime of the European Union, where EC law claims 
supremacy over national laws, including national constitutions, where national courts apply 
directly effective Community law in place of contrary national law at the suit of private parties, 
and where the ‘preliminary reference’ system from national courts to the European court 
functions like an appeals system to ensure the uniform application of EC law across participating 
jurisdictions. As a result, the member states appear to face an ‘all-or-nothing’ environment for 
compliance with EU obligations quite unlike the selective compliance frequently offered to 
obligations of other treaties or international institutions (Weiler 1981).  
It should be immediately obvious that the supremacy and direct effect doctrines of EC law 
could eliminate the ability of organized interests to open up a gap between international legal 
 11 obligations and national law and policy. J.H.H. Weiler, in his tour de force on the ‘transformation 
of Europe’, has argued that, while the ECJ – like other international courts – can only make a 
declaratory judgment which a state can always ignore, the enforcement of EC law by national 
courts makes it “impossible” for member states to disregard EU obligations (Weiler 1991: 2421) 
Weiler concludes that this participation by national courts hinders the common practice of 
‘selective exit’ from costly international legal obligations: 
“Public international law typically allows the internal constitutional order of a state to determine 
the method and extent to which international obligations may, if at all, produce effects within the 
legal order of the state. … In practice direct effect meant that Member States violating their 
Community obligations could not shift the locus of dispute to the interstate or Community plane. 
They would be faced with legal actions before their own courts at the suit of individuals within 
their own legal order. … A national legislature unhappy with an internalized treaty norm simply 
enacts a conflicting national measure and the transposition will have vanished for all internal 
practical effects. By contrast, in the Community, because of the doctrine of supremacy, the E.C. 
norm, which by virtue of the doctrine of direct effect must be regarded as part of the Law of the 
Land, will prevail even in these circumstances.” (Weiler 1991: 2413, 2414, 2415) 
This emphasis on the vital cooperation of national courts with EC law in the enforcement 
of EU obligations – in particular, preventing national legislatures from ‘enacting a conflicting 
national measure’ to disregard an ECJ decision – is widely accepted in the political science 
literature on the effectiveness of Community law and constitutes the conventional wisdom for 
why the EU member states offer ‘constitutional’ obedience EU obligations. A wide range of 
scholars accept that the essential difference between the EU and other regimes is that the national 
courts enforce the supremacy of European law against potentially unwilling elected politicians. 
Alter is typical: "National courts would not let politicians ignore or cast aside as invalid 
unwanted decisions. Nor could politicians veto ECJ decisions through a national political vote, 
because EC law was supreme to national law… In the European Union, […] governments cannot 
selectively opt out of the European legal system ...” (Alter 1998b: 133, 144; Similarly, eg. Alter 
2001: 219; Pollack 1997: 118; Stone Sweet 2004: 25; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998a: 66; 
 12 Conant 2002: 42). The doctrinal claims of European law, together with the application of 
European law by national courts, constitute, as the title of one article bluntly states, ‘The 
European Court’s Political Power’ (Alter 1996). 
The existing political science scholarship adds to European law doctrine a range of 
‘politics of law’ mechanisms and incentives. These mechanisms include the ECJ’s initially 
limited and strategic application of wide-ranging judicial principles, the funding of education and 
propaganda in EC law by the European institutions, transnational actors and interests favoring 
European-wide standards, the force of ‘legal formalism’ and the ‘neutrality of the law’, and 
above all the self-interest of national courts – especially ‘lower’ courts, below the constitutional 
court level – in the power to judicially review national legislation against European standards 
through the preliminary reference system (Weiler 1991; Weiler 1993; Weiler 1994; Alter 1996; 
Alter 1998a; Alter 1998b; Burley [Slaughter] and Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998b; 
Garrett and Weingast 1993). By examining incentives for national courts, this literature claims to 
provide microfoundations – incentives for individual behavior – for national compliance with 
European law (Burley [Slaughter] and Mattli 1993). 
If it were correct that the cooperation of national courts with the EC law doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect prevented national legislatures from legislating contrary to EC law, 
then this would be an answer to the question posed by this paper, because rational egoist interest 
groups facing a stream of costly adjustments from EU obligations would be unable to use 
national legislation to open selective gaps between national policy and international obligations. 
This argument – which is the centrepiece of the conventional wisdom – however faces a very 
considerable difficulty. This is the divergence in doctrinal basis for the effectiveness of EC law, 
 13 including its supremacy, between the judges of the ECJ and national court judges, a divergence 
which reintroduces a national unilateral option vis-à-vis European obligations.  
EC law claims that national judges must, on account of their obligations to the ‘new legal 
order’ of EC law, directly apply EC laws in place of contrary national laws (including national 
constitutional laws) rejecting any requirement for a national act transforming or incorporating 
those European obligations into national law. As a matter of practice, national judges do indeed 
apply directly effective EC law in place of contrary national law, in the absence of specific 
national acts transforming or incorporating these European obligations one-by-one into the 
national legal order. As a matter of national legal doctrine, however, it is domestic legislation – 
national statutes and constitutional provisions that receive EC law into the national legal orders 
by implementing the European treaties – that provides an omnibus permission and requirement to 
apply directly effective Community law obligations as a whole – in toto – in the domestic legal 
order. While EC law doctrine claims that national judges must apply EC law for EC law reasons, 
national judges apply EC law for national law reasons. The national laws that give execution to 
the obligations of the European treaties, in this way, serve a similar purpose to the national laws 
that give execution to the obligations of other treaties.  
The continuing relevance of national enabling laws in the EU member states is a key 
difference between the EU legal regime and the legal regime of a federal state.
5 The effectiveness 
of US federal law in Vermont does not rely on the application of that law by the Vermont courts 
on the basis of a Vermont ‘Federal Obligations Act’ (or constitutional provision) which the 
Vermont legislature has the power to unilaterally restrict – but the effectiveness of European law 
                                                 
5 National courts emphasise the continuing relevance of national law to the application of EC law 
in the national legal order, rather than a prior once-and-for-all national decision to join the EU. 
 14 relies on exactly such provisions. The member states receive Community law, including the 
treaties, into their national law only by virtue of national acts of reception (Hogan and Whelan 
1995: 8, 9-10; Hartley 2004: 244, 243-268; Craig and De Búrca 2003: 315; Andenæs 2002). 
The paradox of Community law is that the jurisprudence of national courts on the 
application of Community law in the national legal order relies on the very national laws that 
Community law distinctively claims to have freed itself from. National courts do not accept the 
ECJ’s foundational claim in Van Gend en Loos that European law is applied ‘independently of 
the legislation of the member states’. National courts, loyal to their own laws and constitutions, 
regard the powers of the European Union institutions as the result of the contingent, limited, and 
reversible delegation of national competences based on national legislation giving effect to the 
obligations of the European treaties, not, as the ECJ does, the permanent transfer of national 
sovereignty
 (D.R. Phelan 1997 provides a thorough discussion).  
Raymond Crotty v An Taoiseach, [1987] IR 713, a judgement in the Irish High Court, will 
serve to demonstrate the national legal basis of Community law in the national legal orders: 
“Had the Oireachtas [the Irish Parliament] not passed the European Communities Act 1972 
Ireland might still have been a member of the Community in international law but it would have 
been in breach of its obligations in international law under the Treaty of Rome and under the 
Treaty of Accession. This however would not have been a matter in relation to which the 
domestic courts of this country would have had any competence because the Treaty would not 
have been part of the domestic law. … Acts of the institutions of the Community derive their 
status in domestic law from the European Communities Act 1972. If the second sentence of the 
Third Amendment is the canopy over their heads the European Communities Act 1972 is the 
perch on which they stand.” 
The German Constitutional Court decision on the Maastricht Treaty, the Maastricht-
Urteil, or Brunner v. European Union Treaty, 89 BVerfGE 155, contains the same reasoning: 
“The Federal Republic of Germany therefore remains, even after the entry into force of the Union 
Treaty, a member of a union of States whose Community Authority derives from the Member 
States and can have binding effect on German sovereign territory only by virtue of the German 
implementing order. Germany is one of the ‘masters of the treaties’, who have based their 
commitment to be bound by the Union Treaty, which is concluded “for an unlimited period” …, 
 15 on their intention to remain in long-term membership, but who could equally, in the final 
analysis, revoke that membership by adopting an act with the opposite effect. The validity and 
application of European law in Germany depend on the implementing law contained in the Law 
Approving the Treaty. Germany thus retains the quality of a sovereign State in its own right and 
the status of sovereign equality with other States...” (Oppenheimer 1994: 557) 
The reliance of national courts on national law for the reception of EC law has been 
characterised as “constitutional disobedience” to EC law in the national legal orders of the EU 
member states (D.R. Phelan 1997: 57). This defiance occurs every time a national court decision 
relies on a national law which enables Community law in the national legal order, or relies on a 
previous court case which contains that reasoning
6. While EC law claims that rights under EC 
law are unmediated by national legislation, national courts insist to the contrary that national 
law’s mediation and authorisation is required for the application of EC law. EC law is not – to 
use Weiler’s phrase – “the Law of the Land” in the member state courts, but is allowed to be so to 
a certain extent and for the time being by national constitutions and legislatures. In effect, the 
member states create a legal status quo where directly effective EC law is automatically 
introduced into the national legal order, and is applied as supreme over contrary national laws, 
but the reasoning for this application is based on national legal provisions.
7  
                                                 
6 Some quantifications of national court defiance of EC law supremacy tend therefore to 
undercount instances where national courts reject ECJ doctrines (eg. Goldstein 2001).  
7 To be sure, much legal scholarship criticises the limited acceptance of Community law 
supremacy by national courts as flawed on various grounds. The criticisms include claims that 
these national court decisions are contrary to Community law or public international law, that 
they misinterpret national constitutional requirements, or that they have the potential for 
significant adverse practical consequences. Nevertheless, since – as the scholarship on the 
politics of EC law emphasises – the all-or-nothing enforcement of Community laws relies on the 
 16 It should now be clear that the divergence in legal reasoning between the ECJ and 
national courts recreates the possibility for organised interests seeking to avoid costs from EU 
obligations to reopen a ‘gap’ between national policy and international obligations. Since EU 
obligations, including those relating to supremacy and direct effect, enter the national legal order 
only through national laws giving full execution to the European treaties, national politicians 
retain the power to unilaterally amend and restrict those enabling laws to selectively remove state 
cooperation with Community law by national legislation, whether statutory or constitutional, 
which explicitly required the disapplication of EC law. As Hartley writes in relation to 
hypothetical British legislation to exclude lamb from other EU member states from the UK 
market, contrary to Community law, by amending the British legislation which gives force to EC 
law in the United Kingdom, the European Communities Act:  
“After the new Act comes into force, a Frenchman arrives at Dover with a consignment of lamb 
destined for the British market. Customs officials turn the consignment back. The importer brings 
proceedings in the English courts claiming that, notwithstanding the Act, he has a right to import 
the lamb. Can it seriously be asserted that the courts would find in his favour? They could not do 
so on the basis of Community law, because the relevant rules of Community law would have no 
legal effect in the United Kingdom: The only basis on which they could have effect – the 
European Communities Act 1972 – would expressly exclude them. The courts could not lawfully 
refer the matter to the European Court, since the provisions allowing or requiring such references 
would no longer have any effect in the United Kingdom. If they did, or if the European Court 
somehow took it upon itself to give a ruling anyway, its ruling would have no legal validity in the 
United Kingdom. In short there would be no legal ground for granting the importer a remedy. It 
might be said that, because Britain has joined the Community, Parliament is bound by the 
Community Treaties and cannot legislate against them … It is, however, well established that 
Parliament can legislate contrary to a Treaty that is binding on the United Kingdom.” (Hartley 
1999: 176-177) 
Zahle writes similarly of hypothetical Danish legislation contrary to European law: 
                                                                                                                                                              
cooperation of national courts, analysis of the EU’s ability to prevent ex post opportunism from 
undermining the European single market must privilege national courts’ own understanding of 
the basis of their cooperation with Community law, rather than that of their critics. 
 17 “Further, since the accession was effected by statute, it can be changed by subsequent statute law. 
The subsequent statute may first of all result in a general amendment of the Accession Act 
whereby the national legal basis for the cooperation with the EU would disappear. Secondly, 
there may be problems in connection with a specific statute that in particular area makes 
provisions in conflict with Community law. If the legislature has unequivocally revoked the EU’s 
powers to regulate the area in question it is undoubtedly possible to legislate in conflict with 
Community law.” (Zahle 1996: 66) 
These scholars are particularly forthright on the position in the UK and Denmark. 
Nevertheless, mutatis mutandis, analogous situations are nevertheless pervasive across the 
member states, since, as the examples of Irish and German court cases cited above demonstrate, 
the jurisprudence of the member states relies on national law to give effect to Community law in 
the national legal order (Taylor 1983: 283-284; Hartley 2004: 244; Hogan and Whelan 1995: 14-
15). The member states have unilateral legislative options they do not try to use. The possibility 
is there, for the EU as for other treaty regimes, for member states to simply enact a conflicting 
national measure, by a national political vote, to remove the internal effects of the EU obligation 
(cf. Weiler 1991: 2415; Alter 1998b: 133). 
Given the jurisprudence of national courts, the fundamental basis of the obedience of the 
EU member states to the European ‘constitution’ therefore rests on domestic legislative politics, 
although this is frequently obscured by a fog of ECJ case-law and ‘constitutionalist’ commentary 
from many political scientists and lawyers. The current political science literature overstates the 
agency of both European and national courts in ensuring compliance with EU obligations, since 
that cooperation derives from the legislative restraint of the elected political authorities in the EU 
member states. If rational egoist organised interests facing costs from EU policies had the 
political influence to obtain the necessary national legislation, they could selectively defect from 
EU obligations, EC law supremacy and direct effect doctrines notwithstanding.  
This conclusion is unaltered by the ‘politics of law’ arguments described above. The 
cooperation of national courts with the EC law has relied on a restraint by national politicians and 
 18 legislatures that legal politics cannot itself explain. Indeed, a neglect of national governments and 
legislative politics is an acknowledged weakness of the ‘politics of law’ literature (Alter 2001: 
62; Haltern 2004: 181). In addition, the mechanisms emphasised by the EU ‘politics of law’ 
literature – the limited application of wide-ranging judicial principles, the ‘neutrality of the law’, 
etc – failed to prevent issue-specific unilateral legislation by states contrary to federal obligations 
in other ‘federations’, including the early US (Goldstein 2001). 
In short, it is not the case that EU member states cannot legislate contrary to EC law. 
National jurisprudence offers straightforward mechanisms by which EU member states could 
legislate to selectively disapply costly EU obligations in the national order, but the member states 
exercise self-restraint so reliably that they offer an obedience that can properly be called 
‘constitutional’. It is not so much the ‘constitutional’ claims of EC law that prevent the member 
states from legislating contrary to EU obligations but rather the fact that the member states 
persistently refrain from legislating contrary to EC law which gives EC law its ‘constitutional’ 
character (Phelan forthcoming). 
Reputation? 
It is common for political science approaches to EC law or the ECJ to ignore or deny the 
member states’ unilateral legislative options (eg. Mattli and Slaughter 1998: esp. 187; Alter 
1998b; Pierson 1996; Stone Sweet 2004; Zürn and Joerges 2005). Nevertheless, these same 
scholars do sometimes, not altogether consistently, make brief references to the possibility of the 
member states unilaterally legislating contrary to EU law by amending the domestic legislation 
implementing the European treaties (Burley [Slaughter] and Mattli 1993: 49; Stone Sweet 1998: 
317; Alter 2001: 193-194).  
 19 Such scholars refer to reputation costs, the risk of antagonising other member states, or 
the creation of precedents for other member states as reasons why EU member states exercise 
self-restraint (Burley [Slaughter] and Mattli 1993: 54; Pollack 1997: 118; Alter 2001: 194). The 
WTO example among others, however, demonstrates that liability to reputation or retaliation 
costs, or damage to regimes as a whole, do not reliably prevent states from defecting from 
international obligations. States frequently defect, because organised interests prefer ‘defection-
plus-retaliation’ or ‘defection-plus-reputation-costs’. Wider comparative studies point in the same 
direction. The early history of the US federation demonstrates that reputation costs do not prevent 
issue-based state legislation against federal legal obligations (Goldstein 2001: 51). From a 
theoretical perspective, state reputation – in many ways similar to regime benefits – constitutes a 
domestic public good to which rational egoist organised interests will avoid paying reliable 
contributions. 
In short, existing explanations for why EU member states obey the European 
‘constitution’ should be rejected because they assume that national legislatures cannot 
unilaterally legislate contrary to EC law, or contain assumptions that relevant public goods will 
be provided.
8 Such explanations may provide microfoundations for national court cooperation 
with EU obligations, but they do not provide microfoundations for the behaviour of national 
interest groups and politicians on which that national court cooperation has in turn depended.  
                                                 
8 This criticism applies also to the prominent claim that the member states accepted EC law 
supremacy because of the continuing unanimity rules for EU political decision-making – that EU 
member states accepted the restriction on ‘selective exit’ in the context of enhanced ‘voice’ – 
because this claim fails to provide a solution to the domestic public goods problems of 
‘constitutional’ compliance even with unanimously adopted EC obligations (Weiler 1981).  
 20 Encompassing Domestic Institutions and Costly International Obligations 
Following the previous discussion, an appropriate explanation for member state 
obedience to the European ‘constitution’ must explicitly provide a solution to relevant public 
goods problems and acknowledge that member states possess – but do not use – unilateral 
options to selectively legislate contrary to EC law. This paper will advance a generalisable and 
portable rationalist explanation for the ‘constitutional submission’ of the EU member states to a 
stream of costly obligations, drawing on a concept from collective action theory which has not 
yet been applied to explaining an international regime: the ‘encompassing group’. 
Organisations vary to the degree in which they are responsive to demands for social 
groups (such as concentrated economic interests) to shift costs onto other groups and wider civil 
society. A key variable in understanding incentives for the pursuit of rent-seeking, as opposed to 
the pursuit of collective goods, is constituency size, where small interest groups have 
overwhelming incentives to pursue income transfers regardless of externalities imposed on 
society as a whole (Olson 1982: 44). Small groups pay 100% of costs accepted to provide public 
goods, while reaping only tiny benefits, while they gain 100% of gains from inefficient rent-
seeking while suffering only a tiny proportion of overall efficiency losses. So small organised 
interests may seek to break treaty obligations regardless of costs to wider society or the regime as 
a whole, or, to take an example from labour market politics, small, firm-level unions may seek 
wage increases regardless of the costs of inflation or strike activity to the economy as a whole. 
Not all groups, however, face the same incentives. Cohesive groups representing 
‘substantial’ constituencies (such as one-third of a total population) – ‘encompassing groups’ – 
receive a considerable share of the gains from collective benefits such as overall economic 
 21 growth, and suffer a considerable share of the costs of policies that contribute to overall 
inefficiencies (Olson 1982: 47-48). 
The logic which Olson applies to encompassing interest groups provides an explanation 
for the decentralised provision of public goods. Cohesive large constituency organisations have 
powerful incentives to accept costs on particular constituents in order to provide public goods 
such as overall economic efficiency to their constituents as a whole. The most prominent 
literature on the explanatory power of encompassing institutions relates to the political 
organisation of labour (Olson 1982: 90-91). A large scholarly literature uses variation in the 
inclusiveness and centralisation of decision-making in organised labour as an essential variable to 
explain variation in unemployment, inflation, strike activity, and other economic indicators. The 
encompassing group concept provides microfoundations for the tendency of inclusive and 
centralized labor movements to provide public goods (eg. Schmitter 1981; Garrett and Lange 
1985; Iversen 1999; Driffill 2006). 
The logic of labour market public goods and encompassing groups developed in the 
literature on labour organisation can be applied equally to public goods derived from 
international regimes and states with encompassing forms of political representation. Like 
federations of labour unions, states are forms of political organisation which vary in the degree to 
which affected constituencies are included in decision-making and in the effective centralisation 
and aggregation of their decision-making authority. Where states’ internal political organisation 
is characterised by centralized, cross-issue, large constituency forms of political institutions – 
encompassing domestic institutions – they similarly have both the capacity and incentives to 
accept costs on particular constituents to support the provision of public goods for their 
constituents as a whole. The stabilisation of expectations and behaviour associated with an 
 22 international regime would result primarily from domestic incentives to provide public goods 
(See Phelan 2008 for a more extensive discussion of the encompassing group and regime theory).  
The explanation advanced here for the ‘constitutional’ obedience of the member states to 
EU obligations is that the EU member states have political systems orientated towards 
centralized, inclusive and cohesive cross-issue decision-making blocs which – as encompassing 
groups – are willing to accept costs in order to secure the provision of public goods. As such, 
they refuse to legislate in response to the demand for defection from costly international 
obligations where these would put substantial public goods – such as the stabilization of 
expectations in the European market – at risk. The member states have legislated to allow and 
require national courts to apply EC law in place of contrary national law, and authoritative 
national decision-makers have large-group incentives to accept costs rather than disrupt the EU 
regime. As a result, issue-specific organized interests facing costs from EU obligations must 
pursue their interests within an environment where, while some delay may be possible (as the 
literature on variation in compliance rates across the EU member states shows), outright 
legislative unilateralism is ‘off the table’. It is this environment which has enabled the success of 
the mechanisms emphasized by the ‘politics of law’ literature. 
The counter-factual is clear: if the political systems of the EU member states permitted 
authoritative issue-specific law-making without restraint by large-constituency orientated 
institutions, the legal procedures of the EU institutions would fail to produce ‘constitutionally’ 
binding effects in practice because issue-specific groups would use national legislation to restrict 
European obligations, just as corporatist bargaining forums fail to reliably produce public goods 
in the context of pluralist or fragmented labor unions (eg. Regini 1984; Crouch 1985). 
 23 To be sure, EU member states – like all governments – produce many policies (including 
policies at the EU level) which inefficiently redistribute income to organized interests. No claim 
is being made that EU member state political systems internalize every externality and produce 
the optimal amounts of all possible public goods. Rather, the large constituency orientation of 
domestic political institutions acts as a constraint on certain forms of inefficient redistribution 
which would benefit issue-specific groups where those conflict with the large constituency 
interest in the stabilization of expectations across the European states. 
Unlike existing alternatives, this approach explains how relevant public goods are 
provided, and incorporates the fact that EU member states retain unilateral options to legislate 
contrary to EU law. This approach also straightforwardly explains why the ECJ was able to 
create an effective supremacy doctrine, recalling that the European treaties did not – and do not – 
provide for such a doctrine, because it is fundamentally the member states’ ‘power to submit’, not 
the ECJ’s ‘power to constrain’, that produces stability and predictability in the relationships 
between the EU member states.  
This explanation possesses, of course, its own testable implications. The argument should 
be rejected if the political institutions of EU member states cannot be characterized as 
‘encompassing’. After all, the argument contends that EU member states have, to an important 
extent, similar domestic political institutions, which may initially strike analysts of European 
politics as implausible. But it is clear that there are limits to the diversity of domestic political 
institutions
9: all of the EU member states are democracies, on the one hand, and none have the 
                                                 
9 Lindseth’s groundbreaking historical work has advanced the argument that European integration 
is related to the rise of ‘administrative governance’ across European nation states, including 
delegated powers (statutory instruments in the UK, decrets-lois in France, Rechtsverordnungen in 
 24 open-agenda and issue-specific law-making institutions that characterize many US states, or the 
United States as a whole for that matter, on the other. This paper considers the political 
institutions in the EU member states using two criteria derived from the literature on 
encompassing institutions in labor market politics, inclusiveness and centralization of decision-
making, which are here combined with a discussion of legislative agenda-control (Schmitter 
1981; Cameron 1984; Golden, Wallerstein et al. 1999; Kenworthy 2003).  
In the literature on corporatism, measures of the degree to which the workforce 
population are represented in trade union federations constitute the inclusiveness of these interest 
organizations. The analogy for political institutions is the proportion of the population or 
electorate required to select a government. Authoritative political institutions in EU member 
states, require the support of substantial proportions – at least one-third – of national electorates 
to form national governments, whether single- or multi-party governments (Eg. Germany: 
Glaessner 2005: 92-94; Ireland: Coakley and Gallagher 1999: 367; Italy: Hine 1993: 71-76; 
United Kingdom: House of Commons 2004: 10). European governments are therefore supported 
                                                                                                                                                              
Germany, etc) and legal solutions to the associated commitment problems, (Lindseth 2002; also 
eg. Lindseth 1999; Lindseth 2003). Lindseth persuasively links this centralisation of decision-
making with the public law doctrines associated with national delegation of powers to the 
European institutions, and, not without contradictions, ECJ doctrine. This paper agrees that the 
EU has been “a beneficiary of a pre-existing transformation of national democracies”, mutatis 
mutandis, across many European countries (Lindseth 2002: 9-10; similarly, Phelan 2002: esp. 
25). The focus here, however, is on the possibility of national legislation contrary to EC law, and 
the application of collective action theory, including the encompassing group concept. 
 25 by wide range of interests, just as inclusive trade union federations are supported by, and make 
decisions affecting, a wide and diverse range of employees and firms. 
In the literature on corporatism, centralization commonly refers to the control of strike 
funds, and the authority to control selection of officers and bargaining at lower levels. Union 
federations with centralized organization can supervise firm- and other lower-level bargaining in 
the interest of overall wage restraint. The analogy for political institutions is the degree of 
centralized control and supervision over policy-making in the myriad of particular issue-areas. 
This aspect is important, because while all democracies might be viewed as at least minimally 
inclusive, not all demonstrate centralized control, coordination and supervision over diverse 
policy issue-areas, because law-making in democracies can equally be fragmented and issue-
specific, as, for example, in the United States or separation of power systems more generally.  
Now it is important to be precise about the particular centralization required by the 
argument developed here. As has been shown above, EU law is enforced in the EU member 
states only because national laws, statutory or constitutional, have created a status quo which 
requires its application. To consider EU member states as ‘encompassing’ for the purpose of their 
‘constitutional’ obedience to European obligations, therefore, requires centralized control and 
supervision of national law-making. Such central control over national law-making is entirely 
compatible with many varied forms of decentralized politics within the member states, including 
powers delegated to national ministries and ‘independent’ regulatory authorities, and the exercise 
of autonomous politics by ‘states’ (eg. German Länder), provinces, and local governments, 
because these authorities cannot restrict the operation of national statutes or constitutional 
provisions providing execution to the European treaties, but rather must operate within an 
environment of obligations accepted by the national parliament and constitution.   
 26 On the centralization of national law-making in EU member states, while of course the 
details of particular national political systems differ, the literature is clear: national law-making in 
particular issue-areas in the EU member states is controlled, supervised and coordinated by 
centralized procedures. The typical EU member state political system, despite many national 
idiosyncrasies, involves two complementary forms of de facto agenda-control on national laws. 
First that only the national government can make effective proposals for new national legislation 
(On the pervasiveness of de facto agenda-control in European states, see eg. Tsebelis 1995; Laver 
and Shepsle 1996; Strøm 2000). Second that proposals within governments for issue-specific 
legislation are vetted and supervised by cross-issue governing bodies such as cabinets and/or 
coalition committees (Eg. Germany: Müller-Rommel 1994: 155, 165, 167; Ireland: Connolly and 
O'Halpin 1999: 258; Italy: Allum 1973: 134; United Kingdom: Mackintosh 1977: 541; 
Pervasively: Martin 2004; Nousiainen and Blondel 1993; even, despite different emphasis, Laver 
and Shepsle 1996: esp. 32-41).
10  
EU member state governments therefore combine inclusiveness and centralization in such 
a manner that they can be considered encompassing. Cross-issue orientated governments in the 
European Union have as much control over new national legislation in particular issue-areas as 
any centralized trade union federation has over strike action in particular firms and sectors, and 
                                                 
10 National governments in the EU member states do not, of course, have complete control of 
national law- and constitution-making. In many states proposals for new national statutory or 
constitutional legislation face veto-points outside the control of the national government. These 
are not, however, mechanisms for open-agenda law-making outside the government’s control.  
 27 similar large-group incentives for restraint in the interest of public goods.
11 This approach offers 
microfoundations for the submission of elected political institutions in the EU member states 
which existing legal and ‘politics of law’ approaches lack. 
It may be worth responding to a possible objection to the argument made here: namely 
that, since there is no variation among the EU member states in their ‘constitutional’ obedience to 
EU obligations, it cannot be shown that the encompassing domestic institutions produce that 
outcome. Now it is true that the EU system is in what might be termed a 'high obedience' 
equilibrium, but that does not itself invalidate the proposed argument. If, in investigating labor 
market politics, one looked only at an example of an ambitious and stable corporatist regime 
between centralized and inclusive labor and employer federations, that would also constitute a 
'high obedience' equilibrium by all bargaining partners. That would not, however, invalidate the 
argument that encompassing institutions were the central cause of that stability. By understanding 
the central theoretical problem – the demand for higher wages by firm-level unions, regardless of 
externalities – or by looking at other labor market bargaining systems, including examples were 
bargained commitments fail to be reliably implemented because of pluralistic trade union 
systems, the importance of encompassing institutions for corporatist stability would become 
clear. The EU is an ambitious and stable international regime between states which share 
centralized and inclusive political institutions. By appreciating the central theoretical problem – 
                                                 
11 The dynamic politics created by electoral competition and change in the EU member states 
deserves a separate discussion. The essential point, however, is that the behavior of cross-issue 
large-constituency orientated governments show considerable regularities even in the case of 
partisan turnover, as does the behavior of small-constituency orientated politicians, such as 
Members of Congress (Eg. Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold et al. 1997 on trade votes in Congress). 
 28 the demand for selective defection from issue-specific interests, regardless of costs to others or 
international regimes – or by looking at other international economic regimes – where bargained 
commitments frequently fail to be reliably implemented because unrestrained interest group 
power encourages unilateral defection – the importance of encompassing domestic institutions for 
'constitutional' obedience to EU obligations is likewise apparent. 
Conclusion 
This paper outlines a new answer to a long-standing political puzzle, why the EU member 
states offer a ‘constitutional’ obedience to EU obligations. Recast in general terms as the 
question, why states submit with a very high degree of reliability to a stream of costs on a variety 
of organised domestic interests, the answer is that states with encompassing domestic institutions 
have both capacity and incentives to accept these costs in order to provide public goods to their 
broader constituents, just as encompassing union federations accept costs to provide public goods 
to their constituents. This is an explanation for ‘constitutional’ obedience to EU obligations by 
rational states and organised groups which does not draw on law or courts as a causal 
mechanism. In its emphasis on the political foundations of legal authority, the argument 
presented here shares affinities with the ‘post-judicial review’ turn in scholarship on American 
constitutional law (Kersch 2004: 6). 
The argument proposed here ties the European Union back into wider themes in social 
science and away from sui generis approaches. The European Union has long been viewed as a 
unique organisation, even an ‘n of 1’, which should be studied separately from other international 
institutions (Caporaso, Marks et al. 1997). There is of course room for different approaches and 
an important place in the study of politics for in-depth knowledge of particular organizations. 
This paper, however, takes the alternative approach, seeking explanations for particular 
 29 international institutions, such as the EU, within the context of generalisable approaches to 
international relations and politics more generally. Like other effective international legal 
systems, treaty obligations in the EU are fulfilled because they are accompanied by, and 
consistent with, rationalist solutions to collective action problems.  
Finally, this approach is consistent with wider trends in international relations scholarship 
which emphasise domestic sources of international stability. If one accepts the arguments of the 
democratic peace literature, for example, then were all states to become democratic, the UN’s use 
of force regime would also appear to be a ‘constitution’, in that all states would comply with 
restrictions on the use of force (eg. Doyle 1986). In that happy state of affairs, however, it would 
be a mistake to attribute causation to UN dispute resolution institutions, or to the International 
Court of Justice’s ‘political power’. Instead, war would have been ended through large-
constituency control of war-making decisions at the domestic level. An intrastate distribution of 
power would solve an interstate problem. In a similar way, the European Court’s ‘political 
power’ has been able to rely on national governments which have incentives to respond to large 
cross-issue constituency interests in the public goods provided by the EU, at least within the 
scope of EU competences to date. A continued focus on domestic mechanisms may therefore be a 
fruitful way to further advance scholarship on international order and stability.  
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